Hello Joe, happy to read you!
I welcome debate between IR schools: keeps them strong and learning. Can you say more on radical constructivism?
Actually, I hold at least one view which I think is constructivist: that through discourse people (including elites) get emotionally invested in certain notions, values, and self-images (including…
I welcome debate between IR schools: keeps them strong and learning. Can you say more on radical constructivism?
Actually, I hold at least one view which I think is constructivist: that through discourse people (including elites) get emotionally invested in certain notions, values, and self-images (including identity and perceived bonds of kinship) in ways which inflect foreign policy. This is a major factor, it seems to me, in the different approaches of France, Germany, and Britain in international affairs since World War II.
I wasn't using GDP as a measure of human well-being but as a proxy for power. Not a perfect measure of this, but perhaps the best single one in our globalized capitalist world. GDP reflects a society's productive and organizational resources, resources that can be used to whatever ends they choose (e.g. development aid, aid to Ukraine, R&I funding...).
I am open to other indicators of scientific and technical achievement other than patents and top scientific articles.
While I take the point on not overstating the validity of economic laws, I’m a bit puzzled by your comment downplaying the link between population size and GDP. For a given level of development, the relationship is self-evident. Of course, it is possible that population decline could be compensated for by higher growth in GDP/capita than other economies, but I have seen no indication this will be the case for Europe going forward.
Relatedly, there are many cases in history of relative population decline being the major factor in power-political decline. I think most notably of France's decline relative to Britain and Germany over the course of the 19th century. In less than a century, France went from being Europe’s cultural hegemon and preeminent military power, somewhat equivalent to the US since World War II, to an unheard of situation of vulnerability to German military power and dependence on British power.
I laud Kate Raworth's efforts to reorient economic policy around planetary boundaries. Her portrayal of economics, not a field I am very fond of, seems overly harsh. Planetary boundaries could be enforced through some traditional economic measures (i.e., taxing environmental externalities, unpopular fossil fuel tax hikes!).
I think she also understates the depth and tragedy of the causes of much inequality and environmental degradation. We have pursued the environmentally-devastating growth imperative globally because people in poor nations want to escape poverty and people in rich nations want purchasing power and (expensive) welfare states. The hedonic treadmill is real.
We have successfully pursued global growth by internationalizing our economies, but in developed countries this has resulted in downward pressure on wages and corporate tax avoidance in low-tax jurisdictions, increasing inequalities. I am often disappointed by progressive economists (like Thomas Piketty) who fail to acknowledge the impact of open borders on inequality in the absence of a global social-democratic state.
It will be interesting to see if “degrowth” can become electable (not a new issue: I recall Plato’s critique of Pericles, one could say he was proposing a kind of political monasticism as an alternative to Athens as a constantly wealth-chasing commercial democracy).
I like what Raworth has to saw on “following the laws of nature.” I think in general we should be more aware of how the evolutionary paradigm applies in human and other systems.
Hello Joe, happy to read you!
I welcome debate between IR schools: keeps them strong and learning. Can you say more on radical constructivism?
Actually, I hold at least one view which I think is constructivist: that through discourse people (including elites) get emotionally invested in certain notions, values, and self-images (including identity and perceived bonds of kinship) in ways which inflect foreign policy. This is a major factor, it seems to me, in the different approaches of France, Germany, and Britain in international affairs since World War II.
I wasn't using GDP as a measure of human well-being but as a proxy for power. Not a perfect measure of this, but perhaps the best single one in our globalized capitalist world. GDP reflects a society's productive and organizational resources, resources that can be used to whatever ends they choose (e.g. development aid, aid to Ukraine, R&I funding...).
I am open to other indicators of scientific and technical achievement other than patents and top scientific articles.
While I take the point on not overstating the validity of economic laws, I’m a bit puzzled by your comment downplaying the link between population size and GDP. For a given level of development, the relationship is self-evident. Of course, it is possible that population decline could be compensated for by higher growth in GDP/capita than other economies, but I have seen no indication this will be the case for Europe going forward.
Relatedly, there are many cases in history of relative population decline being the major factor in power-political decline. I think most notably of France's decline relative to Britain and Germany over the course of the 19th century. In less than a century, France went from being Europe’s cultural hegemon and preeminent military power, somewhat equivalent to the US since World War II, to an unheard of situation of vulnerability to German military power and dependence on British power.
I laud Kate Raworth's efforts to reorient economic policy around planetary boundaries. Her portrayal of economics, not a field I am very fond of, seems overly harsh. Planetary boundaries could be enforced through some traditional economic measures (i.e., taxing environmental externalities, unpopular fossil fuel tax hikes!).
I think she also understates the depth and tragedy of the causes of much inequality and environmental degradation. We have pursued the environmentally-devastating growth imperative globally because people in poor nations want to escape poverty and people in rich nations want purchasing power and (expensive) welfare states. The hedonic treadmill is real.
We have successfully pursued global growth by internationalizing our economies, but in developed countries this has resulted in downward pressure on wages and corporate tax avoidance in low-tax jurisdictions, increasing inequalities. I am often disappointed by progressive economists (like Thomas Piketty) who fail to acknowledge the impact of open borders on inequality in the absence of a global social-democratic state.
It will be interesting to see if “degrowth” can become electable (not a new issue: I recall Plato’s critique of Pericles, one could say he was proposing a kind of political monasticism as an alternative to Athens as a constantly wealth-chasing commercial democracy).
I like what Raworth has to saw on “following the laws of nature.” I think in general we should be more aware of how the evolutionary paradigm applies in human and other systems.
All the best!