Podcast: on Euro-Gaullism, France’s long strategy for a sovereign Europe
I speak on The French History Podcast
I recently spoke with Dr. Gary Girod of The French History Podcast on the subject of Euro-Gaullism: France’s longstanding ambition, at least since President Charles de Gaulle, of creating a more independent Europe.
Euro-Gaullism has had a resurgence of popularity in recent years—which in Brussels-speak corresponds to the concept of “European strategic autonomy.” With the rise of China, Donald Trump’s two elections as U.S. President, the COVID-19 crisis, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the risks of Europe’s overdependence on unreliable foreign powers are now obvious.
Under French President Emmanuel Macron, strategic autonomy for Europe has risen from a marginal French mania to a new European consensus, albeit one whose implications and implementation are uncertain. E.g., even if you accept the idea of strategic autonomy in principle, what does this mean in practice? What sectors should be made-in-Europe? Beyond political will, what policy conditions, notably economic, are needed to re-industrialize?
Way back in the early 2000s, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas—who operated as a kind of conscience for the Federal Republic of Germany—explicitly argued in favor of Euro-Gaullism: that the EU should dare to be independent of the United States, especially when the U.S. behaves badly, as under George W. Bush and Donald Trump. For postwar Germans wedded to Atlanticism, this was no small thing.
Gary and I discuss:
Disatisfaction of the French with the EU together with longstanding majority support for EU membership and the euro.
The country’s oscillating role as an engine and veto-player of European integration (pioneer of the Coal and Steel Community in 1950; proposer in 1950 and sabotager in 1954 of the Defence Community, de Gaulle’s restoration of national vetoes in 1966, pioneer of the Euro, rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by referendum in 2005…).
De Gaulle’s remarkable life and career, putting France among the victors by sheer force of personal will, and founder of France’s current regime, the Fifth Republic.
De Gaulle’s project of French and European independence from the U.S., including the proposals for “political union,” development of nuclear weapons (force de frappe), and withdrawal from NATO integrated command (including kicking out U.S. forces and NATO headquarters, the latter ultimately to Brussels).
The core contradiction of Euro-Gaullism: wanting to build European independence from the U.S. on sovereign nation-states. This implies convincing simultaneously all partner European states to try to be independent of the U.S. This is not plausible given the incentives and possibilities for vetoes and defection.
This contradiction has persisted ever since, including under Presidents François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, such as by creating a common currency and a theoretical EU foreign policy while also championing national sovereignty in order to maintain power in the Élysée. The result is the incoherence of European macroeconomic policy and the weakness of foreign policy, constrained by national vetoes (now 27 and counting).
Where power is “federalized” and broadly majority based—as on trade and regulation—the EU takes decisions that reflect its own preferences, not Washington’s. See: EU trade retaliation against actual and threatened U.S. tariffs (including Trump recently backing down on threats against Greenland), regulation of U.S. Big Tech, large fines against U.S. companies for alleged monopolistic practices, exclusion of most GMOs from the EU market.
The deep tension between French political culture (political voluntarism, executive discretion) and the EU as a rule-bound order. In general, French political discourse on the EU works tends to be symbolic rhetoric (“European power,” “social Europe,” “more Europe”), not institutional thought, which leads to unrealistic expectations and alienation among citizens. By contrast, postwar German political thought, with its emphasis on fixed economic and constitutional rules, is much pedagogically healthier in explaining what the EU actually entails.
France’s geopolitical influence and capability for independent action have declined in recent decades, mostly because of France’s weakening demographic, economic, and fiscal base. (Since 2000, the U.S. population has increased by 61 million, close to the entire population of France.)
Populism is rising in France—a “far-right” nationalist president is not unlikely in the years to come—but I suspect most French will be fearful of the disruption of anything like “Frexit” from the EU and/or the Eurozone.
Amid global uncertainty, Europe has pivoted sharply in recent years: EU policymakers have shifted to a competitiveness agenda—promising to cut regulation and eliminate barriers within the Common Market—and national military spending is way up.
France remains the EU state with the greatest independent nuclear, military-industrial, aerospace, and intelligence capabilities. French assets often serve as essential foundations for European capabilities, as with the spectacular success of Airbus.
